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ABSTRACT
The Federal Government must take action to assure the future adequate supply of spcial nuclear materials for nuclear weapons.
Existing statutes permit the construction of advanced defense production reactors and the reprocessing of commercial spent fuel for the production of special materials. Such actions would not only benefit the US nuclear reactor manufacturers, but also the US electric utilities that use nuclear reactors.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Positive action by the Federal Government is necessary to provide special nuclear materials production to assure the continued effectiveness of US nuclear weapons.
We explore the institutional and societal issues associated with such action in three nonexclusive options. The first option is merely a renovation of existing facil ities and has already been started. weapons-grade plutonium contains 6% impurity of the plutonium isotope 240, fuel-grade plutonium has 12%, and reactor-grade plutonium has about 20-30%. The second concern was real 1y more fundamental on our (JCS) part, and it is the concern that the basic production capabilities of the Department of Energy are aging, tend to be single threat, that is, not sufficiently redundant to be able to handle technical problems, and lacking an expansion capabil ity which, after the Afghan istan si tuati on, seemed to us to be prudent to consider ." 
B.
Assumptions
The basic assumption of this study is that the DOE will have to take some sort of positive action to ensure that the future mil itary needs for 3 plutonium and tritium will be met. These three options are by no means exhaustive or mutually exclusive.
They cover a wide spectrum as far as concerned. This study will focus on choice of each of these options.
II. OPTION1
A. Scope (the) question had to do with plutonium that was identified as unusable in the stockpile report.
I bel ieve you are referring b the mterial that is weapons-grade, but in a condition that it needs to be puri fied, to have certain contaminant materials taken out of it.
Anericium is cme that grws in as the m&rial ages , and another is gall ium, which is one of the stabil izing elements that we put in. 
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Possibly, further protests and confrontations may be generated by any increase in plutonium processing at the Rocky Flats Plant.
III. Even if only one n~defense production reactor were built, it would allow at least one domestic concern to benefit and perhaps to survive.
The competition to build a reactor under Option 2 should be extremely intense.
Option 2 would permit the buil ding of a reactor without first having the design publicly dissected and debated before the NRC, because the "grandfather clause" in the Atomic Energy Act would provide an exemption from the 1 icensing requirement.
If the technology to be anployed in Option 2 were to be trans- This danger WOU1 d be aggravated by the similarity of the nuclear materials and facilities involved in similar processes of devel oping either nuclear power or nucl ear-weapons capab ilities. In turn, these similarities can make the real purpose of a nucl ear devel opnent ambiguous throughout much of the process. The decision to acquire a nucl ear-weapons capability may be faced at any time in the course of this development and is influenced by three primary considerations.
These are the supply of materials, facilities, and expertise; the demand for weapons; and the would-be proli ferator's perceptions of the political and mil iIziryrisks entailed, that is, the risk of detection and response by one or more nations, or by the international community as a whole. *A representati ve selection of the views of those opposed to nucl ear power can be found in Refs. 14-18.
"In facing the complex decision to move toward or acquire nuclear weapons, a nation or a subnational group is 1ikely to choose a course of action that ensures the greatest chance of success at the least risk of detection and response.
Where there is a choice, it is between an independent mil itary capabil ity and an abuse of civilian facilities.
As the development of a nucl ear power program overlaps the devel opnent of a nucl ear weapons program and is recognized as legitimate, so a decision to acquire a nuclear weapons capabil ity can be implemenkd with reduced political and mil itary risks. Thus the applicability of the Option 2 defense production reactor to civilian nuclear power is an anathema to those whose primary concern is nuclear nonproliberation. * It is specious, however, to apply this line of reasoning to the US production of special nuclear materials.
If
The US is already a nucl ear weapons state and there can be, therefore, no valid concern about nucl ear prol ifera- IV.
OPTION 3
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